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The constructivism of scientific knowledge

The author who is a constructivist is defending his point of view concerning the construction of scientific knowledge

Within the philosophy of sciences, there is a debate concerning if the fact that science is constructive empiricism (anti-realism) or not, between the pro-constructive (anti-realism) and the scientific realism.

i) The scientific realism gives us theories that are true in all over the world, it s a true story about the world.

ii) In contrast, the constructive empiricist states that the science theories involve only the observable aspects of the world (and not the inobservable), so the scientific realism is based inly on belief that is true all over the world, on belief that is empirically adequate: according to the author, the facts that scientific knowledge is constructed, doesn’t mean that we understand the non observable facts about life and nature.

According to the author, “empirical adequacy” is the start point of constructivism and not the end point (like for the scientist realism) and it is not an argument to say that the scientific realism is right, it is not the proof of realism.

Latour (1993) prioritized stability in a 2D geometry: Variable=stability; other axis between the 2 poles of nature and society. (Quasi-objects)

In contrast, Haraway (1988) prioritized instability. The objects of knowledge are behind the production of new knowledge (cyborg 1985)

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